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Abstract
We have studied the update operator ⊕1 defined for update sequences by Eiter et al.
without tautologies and we have observed that it satisfies an interesting property1. This
property, which we call Weak Independence of Syntax (WIS), is similar to one of the
postulates proposed by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson (AGM); only that in this
case it applies to nonmonotonic logic. In addition, we consider other five additional basic
properties about update programs and we show that ⊕1 satisfies them. This work contin-
ues the analysis of the AGM postulates with respect to the ⊕1 operator under a refined
view that considers N2 as a monotonic logic which allows us to expand our understanding
of answer sets. Moreover, N2 helped us to derive an alternative definition of ⊕1 avoiding
the use of unnecessary extra atoms.
KEYWORDS: answer set programming, N2 logic, update programs, strong negation,
AGM postulates
1 Introduction
In recent years, a lot of theoretical work has been devoted to explore the relation-
ships between intuitionistic logic and answer set programming (ASP) (Lifschitz et al. 2001;
Osorio et al. 2001; Osorio et al. 2004; Osorio et al. 2005a). These results have pro-
vided a characterization of ASP by intuitionistic logic as follows: a literal is entailed
by a program in the answer set semantics if and only if it belongs to every intuition-
istically complete and consistent extension of the program formed by adding only
negated literals (Osorio et al. 2004). The idea of these completions using intermedi-
ate logics in general is due to Pearce (Pearce 1999b). This logical approach provides
1 This paper can be considered as an extended and revised version of the papers presented in
(Osorio and Zacar´ias 2003; Osorio and Zacar´ias 2004).
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the foundations to define the notion of nonmonotonic inference of any propositional
theory (using the standard connectives) in terms of a monotonic logic (namely in-
tuitionistic logic), see (Lifschitz et al. 2001; Osorio et al. 2001; Osorio et al. 2004).
As Pearce et al. noticed, if we include strong negation we just have to move to
Nelson logics (Lifschitz et al. 2001). We select here N2 logic, because it character-
izes adequately strong equivalence. A formalization of N2 can be obtained from
intuitionistic logic by adding the axiom schema F ∨ (F → G)∨¬G and the axioms
of Nelson logic.
When an intelligent agent obtains new knowledge consistent with its current in-
formation that knowledge is added to the agent’s knowledge base. If however the
new knowledge contradicts the agent’s current information, a method for incorpo-
rating this new knowledge must be developed. In this paper we present our approach
to update nonmonotonic knowledge bases represented as logic programs under
the answer set semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991).
Some well-known recent proposals are presented in (Eiter et al. 2002) and (Alferes and Pereira 2002)
accompanied by very good reviews with many references.
In particular, with the purpose of obtaining a reliable update process for provid-
ing agents with advanced reasoning capabilities, the authors of (Eiter et al. 2002)
present an approach in which new information is incorporated into the current
knowledge base subject to a causal rejection principle. Causal rejection enforces
that in case of conflicts between rules, more recent rules are preferred and older
rules are overridden (Eiter et al. 2002). As was noted in (Eiter et al. 2002), causal
rejection is not novel, and what they provided was a simple and rigorous realiza-
tion of this principle, as well as the formalization of a semantics for updating logic
programs based on it. We developed the present work based on this principle also,
aiming to express program updates succinctly while preserving relevant properties.
In our work we analyze the approach presented in (Eiter et al. 2002) because
under this approach a program is explicitly constructed. We believe that this is
important from a computational perspective and also that such an approach is more
suitable to study the properties of updates based on the causal rejection principle,
since it provides insight into the operation of the principle itself. We go a step
further by presenting an alternative but equivalent definition of update sequences
as presented in (Eiter et al. 2002), for the case when considering two programs and
that avoids the need of new atoms. We consider our definition to be more concise
and accessible.
In this paper we consider many of the properties presented in (Eiter et al. 2002)
because there the authors present a comprehensive analysis about the properties
that an update operator should have. Moreover, we present new properties for
update operators through an extensive analysis and making use of the new charac-
terization of ASP by intermediate logics (Lifschitz et al. 2001; Osorio et al. 2001;
Osorio et al. 2004). In this paper, we consider properties similar to the well-known
AGM postulates. We think that it is necessary to reinterpret them in the context
of nonmonotonic reasoning via ASP. As a starting point, we study Dalal’s Principle
(Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991) of Independence of Syntax, according to which the
meaning of the knowledge that results from an update must be independent of the
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syntax of the original knowledge, as well as independent of the syntax of the update
itself. In (Eiter et al. 2002) the authors analyze and interpret the AGM postulate
corresponding to Dalal’s principle as follows:
T1 ≡ T2 implies S(K ⊕f T1) = S(K ⊕f T2)
where T1 and T2 are any theories, T1 ≡ T2 denotes that T1 and T2 are equivalent,
i.e. they have the same answer sets. By S(P ) we denote the set of all answer sets
of P , “ ⊕f ” is a general update operator. This interpretation expresses a very
demanding principle of independence of syntax, due to the fact that the AGM pos-
tulates were introduced for monotonic logics. We propose to reconsider the AGM
postulates (Alchourro´n et al. 1985) under our new interpretation. To this aim we
have introduced in (Osorio and Zacar´ias 2003) a new property, which we call Weak
Independence of Syntax, as follows:
(WIS): T1 ≡N2 T2 implies S(K ⊕f T1) = S(K ⊕f T2).
where T1 and T2 are any theories, T1 ≡N2 T2 denotes that T1 and T2 are equivalent
in N2, in which case we say that they are equivalent knowledge. We consider this
property to be desirable for any update operator based on ASP. We show that the
proposal introduced in (Eiter et al. 2002) for updates satisfies this principle to a
great extent. In fact we show that for programs without tautologies, this principle
holds. We should point out that this property is accepted as much in belief revision
as in updates, as it is shown in (Eiter et al. 2002).
The main contributions of our paper can be summarized as follows. First, we
present a reinterpretation of the AGM postulates for ASP based on Nelson log-
ics. Second, we present an analysis of how the update semantics presented in
(Eiter et al. 2002) can be expressed in an alternative form without relying on new
atoms. Finally, we analyze the semantics presented in (Eiter et al. 2002) and our
equivalent form in terms of our adaptation of the AGM postulates.
Our paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we present the general syn-
tax of clauses, we also provide the definition of answer sets for logic programs as
well as some background on logic, in particular on N2 logic. In addition, we re-
view the AGM postulates and present the definition of update sequences given in
(Eiter et al. 2002). Next, in Section 3 we introduce our N2 properties motivated
by the AGM postulates. Section 4 presents an approach for update programs char-
acterized by its simplicity. In Section 5 we introduce an alternative but equivalent
definition for update programs as presented in (Eiter et al. 2002) and analyze its
properties. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 Background
In this section we present a brief background on intuitionistic and intermediate log-
ics and introduce the notation and key concepts to be used in this paper. In addition
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we discuss the AGM postulates and present the definition of update sequences given
in (Eiter et al. 2002).
2.1 Intuitionistic and Intermediate Logics
Intuitionistic Logic was introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century and it
was developed as a formal system around the 30s. It is often referred to as Heyting’s
Constructive Logic and here we will represent it by the symbol I. It was proposed
as an alternative to standard propositional logic, which we will represent by C. The
main feature of intuitionistic logic is that in order to be true a proposition must
be constructively verified, i.e. a proof of it must be constructed. For this reason,
intuitionism is usually bound to concepts like proof and knowledge, rather than
to the traditional classical notion of truth. The set H := {∧,∨,→,⊥} denotes the
connectives of intuitionistic logic. All the connectives in H are 2-place connectives,
except for the 0-place ⊥, known as falsum. For any formula p, the expression ¬p will
be understood as an abbreviation of p → ⊥ and ⊤ is an abbreviation of ⊥ → ⊥.
In addition, in this paper we may use the ← operator instead of the → operator
solely as a notational convenience.
For a well known axiomatic formalization of I see (Mendelson 1987). I is strictly
contained in classical logic in the sense that all theorems of I are also theorems of
C, but the converse doesn’t hold. Note that many well known theorems of C are
not theorems of I. The best known examples usually involve negation, like p ∨ ¬p,
and p ↔ ¬¬p, but there are also formulas without negation that are theorems of
C and are not provable in I, for example ((p→ q)→ p)→ p (Pierce’s law).
By adding supplementary axioms to intuitionistic logic, we obtain the logics that
are usually known in the literature as intermediate logics. All of them contain all of
the intuitionistic theorems, and are contained in the theorems of classical logic. If
this containment is strict, they are called proper intermediate logics. Here we will
just use the term intermediate logic or H-logic to refer to any logic that is as least
as strong as I, but strictly weaker than C2. Intermediate logics form a lattice in
which the supremum of all intermediate logics is the unique lower cover of C. Many
names for this logic can be found in the literature, like Smetanich logic, the logic
of Here and There, and Go¨del 3-valued Logic (G3).
2.1.1 Go¨del Multivalued Logics
These logics are defined by generalizing the idea of truth tables and evaluation
functions of classical logic. Go¨del defined the multivalued logics Gi, with values in
{0, 1, . . . , i− 1}, with the following evaluation function I:
• I(B ← A) = i− 1 if I(A) ≤ I(B) and I(B) otherwise.
• I(A ∨B) = max(I(A), I(B)).
2 In a slight abuse of notation we will use the same symbol to refer to a formal logic system as
well as to its theorems.
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• I(A ∧B) = min(I(A), I(B)).
• I(⊥) = 0.
An interpretation is a function I : L → {0, 1, . . . , i− 1} that assigns a truth value
to each atom in the language. The interpretation of an arbitrary formula is obtained
by propagating the evaluation of each connective as defined above. Recall that ¬
and ⊤ were introduced as abbreviations of other connectives.
For a given interpretation I and a formula F we say that I is a model of F if
I(F ) = i − 1. Similarly I is a model of a program P if it is a model of each of the
formulas contained in P . If F is modeled by every possible interpretation we say
that F is a tautology.
Notice thatG2 coincides with classical logic. The 3-valued logicG3 is particularly
useful for some of our results.
2.2 Intermediate Logics and Strong Negation Extensions
In (Nelson 1949) Nelson introduces a logic that extends intuitionistic logic by
adding a new negation connective called strong negation and represented by ∼.
Intuitively, the strong negation connective means that something is known to be
false, not only assumed false due to the absence of a proof. It allows the constructive
falsification of a proposition, in the same sense as intuitionistic logic allows con-
structive verification. This logic is given by the standard connectives of intuitionistic
propositional logic, H, plus the strong negation connective ∼.
We will denote by N the logic obtained by adding the following axiom schema
to Heyting’s axiomatization of intuitionistic logic (Mendelson 1987) (α↔ β stands
for (α→ β) ∧ (β → α)).
A1: ∼(α→ β)↔ α ∧ ∼β
A2: ∼(α ∧ β)↔ ∼α ∨ ∼β
A3: ∼(α ∨ β)↔ ∼α ∧ ∼β
A4: α↔ ∼∼α
A5: ∼¬α↔ α
A6: ∼α→ ¬α for atomic α
Since ∼α → ¬α is a theorem in N for any α (not only atoms)(van Dalen 1986;
Gurevich 1977), the ∼ connective is called strong negation. These axioms are given
in (Vorob’ev 1952a; Vorob’ev 1952b), where N is presented as an extension of in-
tuitionistic logic I, i.e. formulas without the ∼ connective are theorems of N iff
they are theorems of I. Moreover, the same axioms A1 to A6 can be added to any
intermediate logic H to obtain a least strong negation extension of H, which we
will denote by N(H). Strong negation extensions of intermediate logics are some-
times called constructive logics, but here we will just call them N-logics following
(Kracht 1998). Sometimes, we will refer to the intuitionistic fragment of a N-logic
N, i.e. the intermediate logic whose theorems are exactly those of N on the frag-
ment without ∼. This fragment will be denoted as H(N). Least strong negation
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extensions of intermediate logics form a lattice that was deeply studied by Kracht
in (Kracht 1998). There he used algebraic techniques to prove many results, some
of which will be used in this work. Two particular elements of this lattice will be
important for the present work: the logic N, extension of I and lower bound of
the lattice, and the unique upper bound of it, i.e. the extension of G3 which we
will denote by N2. The logic N2 can be obtained by adding the axiom schema
α ∨ (α→ β) ∨ ¬β to N.
A particular feature of N is that the defined connective ↔ is not in general
congruential. For instance, it is known that ∼ ¬a ↔ a is a theorem, however
∼∼ ¬a ↔∼ a is not a theorem. For the restricted class of formulas where ∼
only applies to atoms, our ↔ connective is again congruential as discussed in
(Ortiz and Osorio 2005). We will assume this result freely in the rest of the pa-
per.
It is well–known that provability in N can be reduced to provability in intuition-
istic logic following a simple syntactic transformation (Rasiowa 1974). First, strong
negation is moved towards the atoms using axioms A1 to A5. Next, for every atom
a of the underlying language, a new atom a′ is introduced and all the formulas ∼a
are replaced by a′. Finally, formulas of the form a′ → ¬a are added for each of the
new atoms a′. For example, if we want to know if ∼(a ∧ b) → ¬b is a theorem in
N, we can just check if ((a′ → ¬a) ∧ (b′ → ¬b)) → ((a′ ∨ b′) → ¬b) is a theorem
in intuitionistic logic. By abuse of notation we can understand ∼a as a new atom
and we only ask if ((∼a → ¬a)∧(∼b → ¬b)) → (∼a ∨ ∼b) → ¬b is a theorem in
I. Similarly, provability in N2 can be reduced to provability in G3, the details of
this reduction can be found in (Ortiz and Osorio 2005). We will assume this result
freely in the rest of the paper.
2.3 General Notation
We will represent the set of connectives of Nelson’s logics by N := H∪{∼}, where
∼ is an unary connective. N-formulas are the formulas constructed as in standard
propositional logic using the connectives in N . For any formulas α, β the formula
α ↔ β is an abbreviation of (α → β) ∧ (β → α). As was mentioned before, the ¬
connective can be defined alternatively as ¬ϕ := ϕ→ ⊥. Formulas are constructed
over a set of atoms A. An atom is just a propositional variable. A ∼-literal is either
an atom a or the strong negation of an atom, ∼a. A ¬-literal is either an atom a or
the weak negation of an atom, ¬a. When we use the term literal alone, we mean an
∼-literal l. For a literal l, the complementary literal, ∼l, is ∼a if l = a, and a if l =
∼a, for some atom a. For a set S of literals, we define ∼S = {∼l | l ∈ S}. Similarly,
for a set S of formulas we define ¬S = {¬F | F ∈ S}. Also, if S = {P1, ..., Pn} is a
set of formulas, we define
∧
S = F1∧ ...∧Fn and
∨
S = F1∨ ...∨Fn. We denote by
LitA the set A ∪ ∼A of all literals over a set of atoms A. In addition, we define S
= S∪¬{LitA \S}. A theory is just a finite set of formulas. An rule is an expression
of the form
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A← B1, ..., Bm, ¬Bm+1, ..., ¬Bn (1)
where A and each Bi are literals, ⊤, or ⊥. If B1, ..., Bm,¬Bm+1, ...,¬Bn is ⊤ then
rule (1) is a fact and may be written simply as A. If A is ⊥ then rule (1) is a
constraint, on the other hand, if A is ⊤ then the rule is a tautology. An extended
logic program (ELP) (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) is a finite set of rules. Usually,
A will be identified with the set of all atoms occurring in a program P , in which
case we call it the signature of program P . Every rule can be identified with a
corresponding formula of the form β1 ∧ · · · ∧βm ∧¬βm+1 ∧ · · · ∧¬βn → α, where α
and each βi are literals. Also, a rule r may be abbreviated as H(r)← B(r), where
H(r) and B(r) represent the formulas that comprise the head and body of the rule,
respectively.
Due to transformations, our programs can surpass the class of extended logic pro-
grams. Hence, it is convenient to define an augmented logic program (Lifschitz et al. 1999)
as a finite set of formulas F that adhere to the following CFG:
R ::= F → l
F ::= (F B F ) | ¬F | ⊥ | ⊤ | l , where l is a literal
B ::= ∨ | ∧
For example, the formula (a∨¬ ∼ b)→∼ p can be derived according to the previous
CFG. Parentheses may be omitted following the usual conventions regarding the
precedence of operators and conjunction may be expressed with the comma operator
instead. Henceforth, when we use the term program alone, we mean an augmented
logic program.
With respect to update operators, ⊕f stands for a general update operator,
while ⊕i for some i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n represents a specific update operator whose
definition is introduced.
2.4 Answer Sets
Following the characterization of answer sets for logic programs in terms of interme-
diate logics provided by Pearce in (Pearce 1999b), we adopt the following theorem
as a definition of an answer set, which is discussed in detail in (Osorio et al. 2005b).
Let us introduce the notation T N2 M to stand for the phrase T is consistent
and T ⊢N2 M . We also clarify that by a consistent set of literals M , we mean that
for all literals l ∈ M we have either l ∈ M or ∼l ∈ M , but not both. Finally, we
define the complement of M as M˜ = LitA \M .
Theorem 1
(Osorio et al. 2005b; Ortiz and Osorio 2005). Let P be a program over a set of
atoms A, and let M be a consistent set of literals such that M ⊆ LitA. M is an
answer set of P iff P ∪ ¬M˜ ∪ ¬¬M N2 M .
Our definition yields different results with respect to that given in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991)
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only in that according to ours inconsistent programs have no answer sets.
In addition we adopt the notion of strong equivalence, which represents a property
that is useful in our work.
Theorem 2
(Lifschitz et al. 2001). For any programs P1 and P2, P1 ≡N2 P2 iff for every program
P , P1 ∪ P and P2 ∪ P have the same answer sets.
We also take into account the notion of conservative extension, a property in which
a program preserves its original meaning despite the addition of rules.
Definition 1
(Baral 2003) Let P and P ′ be a pair of programs over sets of atoms A and A′
respectively such that P ⊆ P ′. We say that P ′ is a conservative extension of P if
the following condition holds: M is an answer set for P iff there is an answer set
M ′ for P ′ such that M =M ′ ∩ LitA.
Finally, we will introduce two additional results. But first we introduce the follow-
ing clarification.
We define that a literal l occurs in a formula F recursively as follows
l occurs in l where l is a literal
l occurs in α ◦ β iff l occurs in α or l occurs in β
where α and β are formulas and ◦ denotes one of the operators with which we
construct our formulas as presented in the CFG introduced in Section 2.3. The
previous definition allows us to resolve possible ambiguities. For instance, a does
not occur in ∼a and similarly ∼a does not occur in a.
We say that a literal occurs under the scope of the ¬ symbol when it is affected
directly by the ¬ symbol, or is part of a formula affected by the ¬ symbol. For
example, in the formula a ← ¬(x ∧ b) the literal x occurs under the scope of ¬.
Now consider the formula x ← ¬(x ∧ b). In this formula, the first occurrence of x
is not under the scope of ¬ while the second does occur under the scope of ¬. We
are interested in the case when a literal may only occur under the scope of the ¬
symbol for some formula F , and consequently in a program P , where the previous
condition holds for all formulas F identified with the rules of P .
The first result can be considered of interest by itself 3.
Lemma 1
Let P be a program over a set of atoms A and x a literal that does not occur
in P . Let F be a formula over a set of atoms F such that LitF ⊆ LitA. Then
P ∪ {x← F} ≡ P ∪ {x↔ F}.
3 Essentially the same result was introduced and proved in (Ferraris and Lifschitz 2005) as the
Completion Lemma.
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Proof
See Appendix B.
The second result is the following theorem.
Theorem 3
Let P be a program over a set of atomsA and x a literal that if occurs in P , it occurs
only under the scope of the ¬ symbol. Let F be a formula over a set of atoms F such
that LitF ⊆ LitA and x does not belong to LitF . Then P∪{x← F} ≡ P∪{x↔ F}.
Proof
For a set of literals M we denote by PM(x) the program obtained by substituting
x by ⊤ if x ∈ M or by ⊥ if x /∈ M . The substitution only occurs under the scope
of a ¬ symbol in P .
M is an answer set of P ∪ {x← F}
iff M is an answer set of PM(x) ∪ {x← F}
(by Lemma 1, PM(x) ∪ {x← F} ≡ PM(x) ∪ {x↔ F})
iff M is an answer set of PM(x) ∪ {x↔ F}
iff M is an answer set of P ∪ {x↔ F}.
2.5 AGM Postulates
Although it is not possible to characterize a revision exclusively on logical terms, the
general properties of its associated revision function can be defined and algorithms
to compute it can be developed, at least for some cases (Alchourro´n et al. 1985). In
order to prove if an algorithm is adequate, we need to establish whether its asso-
ciated function follows the properties that would normally be expected to hold in
a belief revision process. In (Alchourro´n et al. 1985) several rationality postulates
are proposed as a standard for analyzing revision functions. These are referred to
as the AGM postulates, in honor of their authors, and are described next.
K-1: for any sentence φ and any belief set K, K ⊙ φ is a belief set.
K-2: φ ∈ K ⊙ φ.
K-3: K ⊙ φ ⊆ K + φ.
K-4: if ¬φ /∈ K then K + φ ⊆ K ⊙ φ.
K-5: K ⊙ φ = K⊥ if and only if ⊢ ¬φ.
K-6: if ⊢ φ↔ ψ then K ⊙ φ = K ⊙ ψ.
In the previous statements ⊙ represents an arbitrary revision operator as dis-
cussed in (Alchourro´n et al. 1985) and not specifically based on answer set seman-
tics, + represents the expansion of a belief set, i.e. adding a sentence regardless
of the consistency of the new belief set. A revision operator represents a function
taking a belief set and a sentence as arguments and producing a belief set as a
result. By belief set we mean a set of sentences closed under logical consequences.
The first postulate requires that the output of the revision function must be a belief
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set. The second postulate guarantees that the new sentence φ will be accepted. The
third postulate states that a revision knows at most, as much as the expansion.
In the case in which the new information φ does not contradict the belief set K
which means ¬φ /∈ K, the K-4 postulate guarantees, in conjunction with K-3, that
revision will be equivalent to expansion. Because the goal of revision is to produce
a new consistent belief set, postulate K-5 establishes that the new belief set has to
be consistent, unless the input sentence φ is inconsistent itself. The content of the
input sentence φ should determine the revision independently of its syntax. This
means belief revisions should be analyzed on the knowledge level and not on the
syntactic level, therefore logically equivalent sentences should lead to equivalent
revisions as postulate K-6 says.
Postulates K-1 to K-6 establish the fundamental properties that any belief re-
vision function should satisfy, for this reason they are called the basic set of pos-
tulates. Together, these postulates aim to capture the basic properties that should
be respected in an ideal form of belief revision.
In (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1992) the authors argue that the AGM postulates
are adequate for the incorporation of new information about a static world, but
not for new information about changes in the world caused by an agent. They
formalize the latter behavior by a set of update postulates. However, all of the basic
AGM postulates except K-1 have direct correspondences in the update postulates
presented in (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1992), hence they can be considered as a
core set of postulates for belief revision as well as for update.
2.6 Update Programs
In (Eiter et al. 2002) an update sequence P is defined as a series (P1, P2, ..., Pn)
of extended logic programs (ELPs). Let us consider the definition of update se-
quence given in (Eiter et al. 2002) but only for the case of two programs and let
us make a slight change of notation. Our proposal can be extended to general case
(P1, P2, ..., Pn) in the iterative form as shown in (Eiter et al. 2002). Under certain
conditions, which exclude possibilities for local inconsistencies, the iterativity prop-
erty holds (Eiter et al. 2002). P is an update sequence over a set of atoms A iff A
represents the set of atoms occurring in the rules of the constituting elements Pi of
P (1 ≤ i ≤ 2). Given an update sequence P = (P1, P2) over A, we assume a set A∗
extending A by new, pairwise distinct atoms rej(r) and Ai, for each r occurring in
P, each atom A ∈ A, and each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2. We further assume an injective naming
function N(·, ·), which assigns to each rule r in a program Pi a distinguished name,
N(r, Pi), obeying the condition N(r, Pi) 6= N(r
′, Pj) whenever i 6= j. With a slight
abuse of notation we shall identify r with N(r, Pi) as usual. Finally, for a literal L,
we write Li to denote the result of replacing the atomic formula A of L by Ai.
Definition 2
(Eiter et al. 2002) Given an update sequence P = (P1, P2) over a set of atoms A,
we define the update program P⊕1 = P1 ⊕1 P2 over A
∗ consisting of the following
items:
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(i) all constraints in P1 ∪ P2;
(ii) for each r ∈ P1;
L1 ← B(r),¬rej(r).
rej(r)← B(r),∼ L2.
}
if H(r) = L;
(iii) for each r ∈ P2;
L2 ← B(r). if H(r) = L;
(iv) for each literal L occurring in P ;
L1 ← L2
L ← L1.
This definition relies on the fact that rules in program P2 cannot be rejected, which
allows us to construct a simplified program as was noted in (Eiter et al. 2002). It is
important to note that the update sequence P is also an extended logic program.
The answer sets of P are defined in terms of the answer sets of P⊕1 .
Definition 3
(Eiter et al. 2002) Let P = (P1, P2) be an update sequence over a set of atoms A.
Then, S ⊆ LitA is an update answer set of P iff S = S′ ∩ A for some answer set
S′ of P⊕1 . The collection of all update answer sets of P is denoted by U(P).
An important remark in relation to update programs is presented in (Eiter et al. 2002).
Update programs do not satisfy many of the properties defined in the literature.
This is partly explained by the nonmonotonicity of logic programs and the causal
rejection principle embodied in the semantics, which strongly depends on the syn-
tax of rules (Eiter et al. 2002).
3 Properties
In this section we present some basic properties about update operators. The first
four are taken from (Eiter et al. 2002) and are all satisfied by the ⊕1 operator.
The remaining are adapted versions of the AGM postulates. In the statements that
follow ⊕f denotes an arbitrary update operator and P a program. Given two pro-
grams P and P ′, we write P ≡ P ′ if they have the same answer sets.
Initialization: ∅ ⊕f P ≡ P
The authors of (Eiter et al. 2002) present this property as follows: this property
states that the update of an initial empty knowledge base yields just the update
itself.
Idempotence: P ⊕f P ≡ P
This property means that the update of programP by itself has no effect (Eiter et al. 2002).
Noninterference: If P1 and P2 are programs defined over disjoint alphabets,
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then P1 ⊕f P2 ≡ P2 ⊕f P1
This property implies that the order of updates which do not interfere with each
other is immaterial (Eiter et al. 2002).
Augmented update: If P1 ⊆ P2 then P1 ⊕f P2 ≡ P2
Updating with additional rules makes the previous update obsolete (Eiter et al. 2002).
Note that the idempotence property represents a special case of this property.
The following properties are motivated by the AGM postulates. We observe that
the interpretation given in (Eiter et al. 2002) of the AGM postulates is sometimes
very demanding, particularly because the AGM postulates were introduced for
monotonic logics. However, since answer set programming is related to the well
known N2 monotonic logic, it makes sense to consider properties that relate the
monotonic part of answer sets to its non-monotonic side. That is the objective of
the following properties.
Let P, P1, P2, and R be programs and x a rule.
BK-1: P ⊕f {x} is a program.
BK-2: P1 ⊕f P2 ⊢N2 P2.
BK-3: P1 ∪ P2 ⊢N2 P1 ⊕f P2.
BK-4: if P1 ∪ P2 has answer sets then P1 ∪ P2 ≡ P1 ⊕f P2.
BK-5: P2 ≡N2⊥ implies (P1 ⊕f P2) ≡N2⊥ .
BK-6: if P1 ≡N2 P2 then P ⊕f P1 ≡ P ⊕f P2.
In the following we call these properties the BK-ASP properties. In Section 2.5
we restated the 6 principles introduced in (Alchourro´n et al. 1985) (K-1,..., K-6),
we now translate principle K-i from (Alchourro´n et al. 1985) to property BK-i in
our approach. However, it should be noted that this is not the only translation
possible. In BK-1 the notion of belief set is replaced by logic program. In the
AGM postulates a sentence is part of a belief set whenever the belief set logically
entails the sentence, for BK-2 and BK-3 we require that a program has to be
inferred in N2. Like their counterparts, together properties BK-3 and BK-4 state
that program update should be equivalent to expansion whenever possible, only that
equivalence is understood as having the same answer sets. BK-5 establishes that an
inconsistent program in N2 will lead to an inconsistent update. We adopt only one
of the implications of the original K-5 postulate; because we consider excessive, in
our context, to demand an update operator to derive from an inconsistent program,
a new consistent program given a possibly completely independent update4. BK-6
says that equivalent programs should lead to equivalent updates, but the programs
4 Consider for instance updating the program {a,← a} with {b}.
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have to be equivalent inN2, i.e., strongly equivalent and it is only expected that the
updates will have the same answer sets. Finally, we present an additional property
and prove that it is in fact equivalent to BK-6.
Theorem 4
An update operator ⊕f satisfies the BK-6 (WIS) property if and only if it satisfies
the following property
BK-0: if P2 ⊢N2 R then P1 ⊕f P2 ≡ P1 ⊕f (P2 ∪R).
Proof
To prove the right implication we have that
P2 ⊢N2 R implies P2 ≡N2 P2 ∪R
now by applying BK-6 we obtain
P1 ⊕f P2 ≡ P1 ⊕f (P2 ∪R) as desired.
For the left implication, by applying BK-0 we obtain
P ⊕f P1 ≡ P ⊕f ( P1 ∪ P2 )
similarly,
P ⊕f P2 ≡ P ⊕f ( P2 ∪ P1 )
hence
P ⊕f P1 ≡ P ⊕f P2 as desired.
4 A Basic Definition for Updates
In this section we present a simpler new definition for updates. We also prove that
it is equivalent to ⊕1 for a class of programs involving tautologies, which we will
define as tau-comp. The relevance of this approach relies on its simplicity and the
insight it provides on the ⊕1 operator, which will become clearer when we introduce
a possible refinement of this new operator as well as our alternative definition of
⊕1. The notational conventions presented in Section 2.6 apply to this section as
well.
Definition 4
Given an update sequence P = (P1, P2) over a set of atoms A, we define the update
program P⊕2 = P1 ⊕2 P2 over A
∗ consisting of the following items:
(i) all constraints in P1 ∪ P2;
(ii) for each r ∈ P1;
L ← B(r),¬ ∼L. if H(r) = L;
(iii) all rules r ∈ P2.
Example 1
To illustrate this definition consider the following update sequence.
Let P1 be: sleep ← night, ¬watch-tv, ¬other.
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night.
tv-on ← ¬tv-broke.
watch-tv ← tv-on.
Let P2 be: ∼tv-on ← power-failure.
∼tv-on ← assignment-due, working.
assignment-due.
working.
other ← working.
If we update P1 with P2 we obtain the following program P1 ⊕2 P2:
sleep ← night, ¬watch-tv, ¬other, ¬ ∼sleep.
night ← ¬ ∼night.
tv-on ← ¬tv-broke, ¬ ∼tv-on.
watch-tv ← tv-on, ¬ ∼watch-tv.
∼tv-on ← power-failure.
∼tv-on ← assignment-due, working.
assignment-due.
working.
other ← working.
This program has a unique expected answer set, namely
{night, other, assignment-due, working, ∼tv-on}.
Definition 5
We say that a program P is tau-comp w.r.t. a signature A if every rule of the form
l← l belongs to P , where l is a literal over A.
We will now prove that ⊕1 and ⊕2 are equivalent for tau-comp programs. The proof
is based on results from (Osorio et al. 2001; Osorio et al. 2004; Pearce 1999a).
Theorem 5
Let P1 and P2 be extended logic programs, if P2 is tau-comp then P1 ⊕1 P2 ≡
P1 ⊕2 P2.
Proof
The idea of the proof is to apply transformations to P1⊕1P2 with respect to answer
sets over the A signature, to obtain P1 ⊕2 P2. At some point we may delete rules
involving a particular literal that we regard as temporary, i. e., a literal that does
not form part of the A signature of the programs in the update sequence. This is
due to the fact that the program that contains such rules is a conservative extension
of the program that excludes them.
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Consider a particular positive literal L (i.e. a literal consisting of an atom a not
preceded by ∼). By construction of P1 ⊕1 P2 (defined in Point (iv) of Definition 2
given in Section 2.6) the program includes the formulas L1 ← L2 and L ← L1 for
the literal L.
Also, since P2 is tau-comp then it includes the rules L2 ← L for the literal L.
Hence, P1 ⊕1 P2 ⊢N2 L1 ↔ L2 and P1 ⊕1 P2 ⊢N2 L2 ↔ L.
So we can replace each of the L1 and L2 literals by L in the rest of the program as
discussed in (Rasiowa 1974; Ortiz and Osorio 2005) 5. Then, we can eliminate rules
in Point (iv) of Definition 2 given previously as well as rules of the form L2 ← L
(L1 and L2 are temporary literals).
So, the rules become L← B(r), ¬rej(r) and
rej(r) ← B(r), ∼L corresponding to program P1.
L← B(r) corresponding to program P2.
Now, observe that by Theorem 3 the answer sets of the program are the same
if we replace rej(r) ← B(r), ∼L by rej(r) ↔ (B(r)∧ ∼L). Observe that this
transformation creates a rule whose form is different from that of rules of ELPs,
however this situation is already considered in (Osorio et al. 2004; Pearce 1999a;
Ortiz and Osorio 2005). Then we can replace rej(r) in L← B(r)∧ ¬rej(r) to ob-
tain:
L← B(r) ∧ ¬(B(r)∧ ∼L) (*)
then we can delete the rule rej(r)↔ (B(r)∧ ∼L) since rej(r) is a temporary literal.
Finally, to obtain the desired program, the rule of the form (*) can be replaced by
L← B(r),¬ ∼L following the next transformation
L← B(r) ∧ (¬B(r) ∨ ¬ ∼L)
by applying the De Morgan law, and
L← (B(r)∧ ¬B(r)) ∨ (B(r)∧ ¬ ∼L)
by applying the distributive property. The previous rule can in turn be divided
into two rules
L← (B(r) ∧ ¬B(r)) (1)
L← (B(r) ∧ ¬ ∼L) (2)
Rule (1) is a tautology and can therefore be eliminated, leaving only rule (2) which
has the desired form according to Definition 4. This process can be applied anal-
ogously for the rest of the literals. In this way, except for the tautologies of P2,
5 For a positive literal consisting of an atom a we also replace the atoms of the corresponding
negative literals ∼a.
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which have no effect on the answer sets of the derived program, we reach program
P1 ⊕2 P2 as desired.
Theorem 6
The update operator ⊕2 satisfies the properties BK-1, BK-2, BK-3, BK-5, and
BK-6.
Proof
Properties BK-1, BK-2, BK-3, and BK-5 follow directly by construction. The
BK-6 property follows straightforward by construction and Theorem 2.
This allows us to formalize our first result regarding the satisfability of the WIS
property for the ⊕1 operator.
Corollary 1
Let P be an ELP program and let P1 and P2 be tau-comp ELPs.
If P1 ≡N2 P2 then P ⊕1 P1 ≡ P ⊕1 P2.
Proof
The result is immediate from the equivalence of the ⊕1 and ⊕2 operators for tau-
comp programs presented in Theorem 5.
The BK-4 property is not satisfied in general. Consider the following example
inspired from (Banti et al. 2003).
Example 2
Let P1 be: day ← ¬night.
night ← ¬day.
see-stars ← night, ¬cloudy.
∼see-stars.
The only answer set of this program is {∼see-stars, day}. Now, suppose that P1
is updated with:
Let P2 be: see-stars ← see-venus.
see-venus ← see-stars.
Applying the ⊕2 operator the answer sets of P1 ⊕2 P2 are: {see-stars, see-venus,
night}, {∼see-stars, day}, and {∼see-stars, night}, while P1 ∪ P2 has the unique
answer set {∼see-stars, day}. As we can see, the update process results in additional
answer sets, so BK-4 doesn’t hold.
This proposal satisfies the initialization, idempotence, and augmented update
properties. The initialization property follows directly by construction. The aug-
mented update property is satisfied because P1 ⊕1 P2 is equivalent in N2 to P2
whenever P1 ⊆ P2. Since the idempotence property is actually a special case of the
augmented update property, it holds also. As the following example shows, this new
update operator (⊕2) doesn’t satisfy the noninterference property.
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Example 3
This example shows that the noninterference property is not satisfied by the ⊕2
operator.
Let P1 be: day ← ¬night.
night ← ¬day.
see-stars ← night, ¬cloudy.
∼see-stars.
Let P2 be: ∼tv-on ← power-failure.
power-failure.
If we update P1 with P2 we obtain the following results:
P1 ⊕2 P2 6= P2 ⊕2 P1, because P2 ⊕2 P1 has only one answer set, while P1 ⊕2 P2
adds more models. Thus, the update operator⊕2 doesn’t satisfy the noninterference
property.
With a slight modification in the definition of ⊕2, this property can be satisfied.
We simply need to add the weakly negated literals only to those rules r in program
P1 for which there is a conflictive rule r
′ in P2, i.e., rules for which H(r) =∼ H(r
′).
We denote this modified update operator by ⊕′2. However, this results in the loss
of the BK-6 property, as the following example shows.
Example 4
Consider the following programs.
Let P be: a← ¬ ∼a. Let P1 be: a← a. Let P2 be: b.
∼a. b.
Here P1 and P2 are equivalent in N2. For the update program P ⊕′2 P1 we obtain
the answer sets {a, b} and {∼a, b}, while P ⊕′2P2 has the unique answer set {∼a, b},
therefore BK-6 (WIS) fails. In addition, the BK-4 property is still not satisfied, as
applying the ⊕′2 operator to the update sequence of Example 2 would show. In the
next section we present Example 6, where ⊕′2 also yields unintended answer sets.
5 An Alternative Definition for Updates
In this section we introduce an alternative definition for updates as defined by the
⊕1 operator, prove that it is equivalent for single updates (i.e., update sequences
consisting of two programs), and analyze its properties.
Definition 6
Given an update sequence P = (P1, P2) over a set of atoms A, we define the update
program P⊕3 = P1 ⊕3 P2 over A
∗ consisting of the following items:
(i) all constraints in P1 ∪ P2;
(ii) for each r ∈ P1;
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L← B(r), ¬sup(comp(L), P2). if H(r) = L;
(iii) all rules r ∈ P2.
where
comp(L) = ∼L.
comp(∼L) = L.
Also, for a program P and a literal L let
KL = { B(r) | H(r) = L, r ∈ P }
and
sup(L,P) =

∨
KL if KL 6= ∅, ⊤ /∈ KL.
⊥ if ¬∃ r ∈ P | H(r) = L.
⊤ if ∃ r ∈ P | B(r) = ⊤, H(r) = L.
Note that sup(L,P) essentially takes a disjunction of the bodies of the rules that
have L in their head, or evaluates to ⊥ in case L does not appear in any of the heads
of the rules of program P . Also note that sup(L,P) evaluates to ⊤ if L appears as
a fact in P , i.e., a rule of the form L← ⊤.
Example 5
We apply this definition to the update sequence presented in Example 1. If we up-
date P1 with P2 we obtain the following program P1 ⊕3 P2:
sleep ← night, ¬watch-tv, ¬other.
night.
tv-on ← ¬tv-broke, ¬(power-failure ∨ (assignment-due ∧ working))
watch-tv ← tv-on.
∼tv-on ← power-failure.
∼tv-on ← assignment-due, working.
assignment-due.
working.
other ← working.
This program has the same unique answer set that was obtained in Example 1,
namely {night, other, assignment-due, working, ∼tv-on}.
It is important to consider that the updated program is no longer an extended
logic program. The following lemma shows that our approach is equivalent to the
⊕1 operator.
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Theorem 7
For any extended logic programs P1 and P2, P1 ⊕1 P2 ≡ P1 ⊕3 P2.
Proof
We apply a series of transformations to P1 ⊕1 P2 with respect to answer sets over
the A signature, to obtain P1 ⊕3 P2. At some point we may delete rules involving
a particular literal that we regard as temporary, i. e., a literal that does not form
part of the A signature of the programs in the update sequence. This is due to the
fact that the program that contains such rules is a conservative extension of the
program that excludes them.
Note: in our proof we will apply the following transformation several times. For a
subset of rules {L← α1, . . . , L← αn} of a program P , where L denotes a particular
literal and each αi an arbitrary formula representing the body of its respective rule,
we join the rules of the subset into a single rule of the form L ← α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αn by
taking the disjunction of the bodies of all the rules. Thus, such subset of rules can
be replaced by a single rule in program P , as long as all the rules that have L as its
head have been taken into consideration. This transformation can also be applied
inversely to decompose a rule.
Considering a particular literal L, the rules of P1 ⊕1 P2 are of the form
L1 ← B(r), ¬rej(r) *
rej(r)← B(r), ∼L2
L2 ← B(r′) *
L1 ← L2
L← L1
where r represents a rule from program P1, r
′ a rule from program P2, and *
denotes the possible existence of multiple rules of the same form (i.e. rules with
the same head but different bodies). The first two types of rules come from Point
(ii) of Definition 2, while the third comes from Point (iii) and the last two from
Point (iv). Constraints are omitted since they undergo no changes. First, we ap-
ply the unfolding transformation (see (Baral 2003)). The rule L1 ← L2 is unfolded
with respect to the rules L2 ← B(r
′), i.e., the rule L1 ← L2 is replaced by n
rules of the form L1 ← B1(r′) ; ... ; L1 ← Bn(r′) resulting from each of the n rules
L2 ← B1(r′) ; ... ; L2 ← Bn(r′). Thus the following equivalent set of rules is derived
L1 ← B(r), ¬rej(r) *
rej(r)← B(r), ∼L2
L2 ← B(r′) *
L1 ← B(r′) *
L← L1
By Theorem 3 the answer sets of the program are the same if we replace the rule
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rej(r)← B(r), ∼ L2 by rej(r) ↔ (B(r)∧ ∼L2). Then we can replace rej(r) in all
rules L1 ← B(r)∧ ¬rej(r) to obtain rules of the form
L1 ← B(r) ∧ ¬(B(r)∧ ∼L2) (1)
and afterwards we can delete the rule rej(r) ↔ (B(r)∧ ∼L2) since rej(r) is a
temporary literal. The rule of the form (1) can be replaced by L1 ← B(r) ∧ ¬ ∼L2
following the next transformation. First, by applying the De Morgan law we obtain
L1 ← B(r) ∧ (¬B(r) ∨ ¬ ∼L2)
Then, by the distributive property the previous rule becomes
L1 ← (B(r) ∧ ¬B(r)) ∨ (B(r) ∧ ¬ ∼L2)
This rule can in turn be divided into two rules
L1 ← (B(r) ∧ ¬B(r)) (a)
L1 ← (B(r) ∧ ¬ ∼L2) (b)
Rule (a) is a tautology and can therefore be eliminated. In this way we arrive
to the following set of rules
L1 ← B(r), ¬ ∼L2 *
L2 ← B(r
′) *
L1 ← B(r′) *
L← L1
Now we join all the rules that contain ∼L2 in the head into a single rule
∼L2 ← B1(r′′) ∨B2(r′′) ∨ ... ∨Bn(r′′) (c)
where r′′ represents a rule of program P2. By Theorem 3 this allows us to re-
place ∼L2 in rules (b) to obtain rules of the form
L1 ← B(r),¬(B1(r′′) ∨B2(r′′) ∨ ... ∨Bn(r′′)) (d)
Note that rule (d) has the form of Point (ii) of our definition and that rule (c)
can be eliminated since ∼L2 is a temporary literal. Now we join the bodies of all
rules (d) and L1 ← B(r
′) into a single rule L1 ← α where α abbreviates the com-
posed body. Similarly, we also join the bodies of all the rules L2 ← B(r
′) to obtain
the rule L2 ← β. Thus we derive a new set of rules
L1 ← α
L2 ← β
L← L1
Then we can delete the rule L2 ← β since L2 is a temporary literal. Next we
replace L1 in the third rule for α generating the rule L← α. At this point the rule
L1 ← α can be eliminated because L1 is a temporary literal. By decomposing the
remaining rule L← α we can generate the rules
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L← B(r),¬(B1(r′′) ∨B2(r′′) ∨ ... ∨Bn(r′′)) *
L← B(r′) *
The first rule represents the set of rules of the Point (ii) of Definition 6, while
the second rule represents the set of rules created with Point (iii). We can apply
this process analogously for the rest of the literals. After this sequence of transfor-
mations we obtain the same set of rules as by applying our definition, thus the two
operators are equivalent.
Initially, it may appear that the ⊕3 operator could be equivalent to the ⊕′2
operator discussed in Section 4. However, as the following example shows, this is
not the case.
Example 6
Consider the following programs.
Let P1 be: a← ¬ ∼a. Let P2 be: a← c.
∼a. b.
∼c.
The updated program P1 ⊕′2 P2 has the answer sets {∼a, b, ∼c} and {a, b, ∼c}
while P1⊕3 P2 has the unique answer set {∼a, b, ∼c}. For this particular example,
we can say that the ⊕3 operator incorporates the new knowledge more accurately,
since a should not be derived if it depends on c, which is not true in the first place.
Nevertheless, for the cases in which there are no conflicting literals in the first of
the programs, the operators in question would be equivalent.
Next we will discuss how this definition of update programs relates to the BK-
ASP properties presented earlier.
Definition 7
A program P is tau-free w.r.t. a signature A if no rule of the form l← l, α belongs
to P , where α is a formula which could be empty and l a literal over A. By abuse of
notation we define a tau-free rule as a rule that does not follow the structure just
described.
Theorem 8
The update operator ⊕3 satisfies the BK-ASP properties BK-1, BK-2, BK-3
and BK-5 for any extended logic programs P , P1, and P2 as well as BK-6 if P1
and P2 are tau-free ELPs.
Proof
The first four properties follow directly by construction. The proof that BK-6 holds
for tau-free ELPs for the operator ⊕1 is presented in Lemma 7 of Appendix A.
Because the operator ⊕3 is equivalent to the operator ⊕1 that result applies as
well.
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We now make use of the examples of Section 4 to demonstrate that the proper-
ties BK-4 and BK-6 are not satisfied in general by the update operator ⊕3 and
equivalently by ⊕1.
First, we apply the operator ⊕1 to the update sequence in Example 2. The answer
sets of P1⊕1P2 are: {see-stars, see-venus, night} and {∼see-stars, day}, while P1∪P2
has the unique answer set {∼see-stars, day}. As we can see, the update process adds
a second answer set, so BK-4 doesn’t hold.
Now, when we consider the update sequences of Example 4 we obtain the follow-
ing results. The programs P1 and P2 are equivalent in N2. For the update program
P ⊕1P1 we obtain the answer sets {a, b} and {∼a, b}, while P ⊕1P2 has the unique
answer set {∼a, b}, therefore BK-6 (WIS) fails.
In order to resolve the previous discrepancies, the update semantics can be refined
in the following way
P1 ⊕
′
3 P2 =
{
P1 ∪ P2 if P1 ∪ P2 has answer sets
P1 ⊕3 P ′2 otherwise
where P ′2 is P2 without tautologies. In this way all of the BK-ASP properties we
have presented are satisfied.
Theorem 9
The update operator ⊕′3 satisfies the BK-ASP properties BK-1 to BK-6 for any
extended logic programs.
Proof
Because of the refinement just introduced, property BK-4 holds and the rest of the
first five properties follow directly by construction. We prove that BK-6 holds for
the operator ⊕′3 as follows. For the ELPs P1 and P2 we assume P1 ≡N2 P2. Now if
P ∪ P1 has answer sets, by Theorem 2 these are the same answer sets of P ∪ P2,
which is P ⊕′3 P2 according to our definition. If P ∪ P1 does not have answer sets,
then Lemma 7 (see Appendix A) applies, since tautologies are removed from the
right operand, i.e., the program that introduces the new rules.
The previous theorem demonstrates that in principle it is possible to define a
semantics that satisfies all of the BK-ASP properties, which is important from a
mathematical viewpoint. However, this semantics is not free of counterintuitive and
undesirable behaviors, as was brought to our attention by one of our anonymous
reviewers with the following examples (adapted to include strong negation).
Example 7
Consider the following programs.
Let P be: see-stars. Let P1 be: see-stars ← see-stars.
∼see-stars.
Let P2 be: see-stars ← see-venus.
see-venus ← see-stars.
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The program P ⊕′3P1 does not have answer sets, as would normally be expected.
However, the program P ⊕′3 P2 has the single answer set {see-stars, see-venus},
which intuitively should not have been derived from the new information in P2.
Example 8
Consider the following programs.
Let P1 be: open-school. Let P2 be: ∼open-school ← holiday.
holiday ← ¬workday. workday ← ¬holiday.
Let P3 be: see-stars. Let P4 be: ∼see-stars.
Program P1⊕′3P2 has the single answer set {open-school, workday}, which is the
same single answer set of P1 ∪ P2. However, program (P1 ∪ P3) ⊕′3 (P2 ∪ P4) has
two answer sets, namely {open-school, workday, ∼see-stars} and {holiday, ∼open-
school, ∼see-stars}. The addition of rules affects the interpretation of other rules,
despite having disjoint alphabets. Therefore the ⊕′3 operator violates the general
principle that completely independent parts of a program should not interfere with
each other.
The existence of such undesirable behaviors suggests the need of analyzing alter-
native semantics for logic program updates, considering for instance the semantics
presented in (Banti et al. 2005) and (Homola 2005). We consider this to be an in-
teresting direction for future work.
6 Conclusions
We have presented a set of properties based on N2 logic that provide a rein-
terpretation the AGM postulates into the context of answer set programming.
These properties hold for update programs following the definition presented in
(Eiter et al. 2002) after an unsubstantial modification of its semantics. In addition,
we introduced an alternative definition for update programs that is equivalent, yet
more concise and intuitive. There are many aspects to consider in the theory of be-
lief revision and update. The desired behavior in a particular situation may prove
inappropriate in a different setting. It is essential to characterize the properties that
ought to be respected in the process of belief change, however, it is unlikely that
such characterization can be reduced to a set of generally accepted and applicable
postulates. We can also conclude that the approach based on N2 logic for the char-
acterization of answer sets has proven useful to obtain a better understanding of
the answer set semantics, as well as to study many of its interesting properties.
We emphasize that with the properties presented in this paper we aim only to
provide a starting point for the analysis of belief revision under answer set seman-
tics. Still more work needs to be done to identify new interesting properties and
define alternative operators for belief change.
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Appendix A Analysis of the WIS property
We prove that the operator ⊕1 satisfies the Weak Independence of Syntax property
for tau-free programs.
Definition 8
(Eiter et al. 2002) Let us call two rules r1 and r2 conflicting iff H(r1) = ∼H(r2),
we denote this by r1 ⊲⊳ r2.
Definition 9
(Eiter et al. 2002) For an update sequence P = (P, ..., Pn) over a set of atomsA and
S ⊆ LitA based on the principle of founded rule rejection, we define the rejection
set of S by Rej(S, P) = ∪ni=1 Reji(S, P), where Rejn(S, P) = ∅ and, for n > i ≥ 1,
Reji(S, P) = {r ∈ Pi | ∃r′ ∈ Pj \Rejj(S, P), for some j ∈ {i+ 1, ..., n}
such that r ⊲⊳ r′ and S ⊢N2 B(r) ∧B(r
′)}.
Definition 10
(Eiter et al. 2002) For an update sequence P = (P, ..., Pn) over a set of atoms A
and S ⊆ LitA, let us define
Rej′(S, P) = ∪ni=1{r ∈ Pi | ∃r
′ ∈ Pj , for some j ∈ {i+ 1, ..., n}
such that r ⊲⊳ r′ and S ⊢N2 B(r) ∧B(r
′)}.
Note a: Observe that Rej and Rej′ coincide for two programs. Furthermore
Rej′(S, (P1, P2)) = {r ∈ P1 | ∃r′ ∈ P2, such that r ⊲⊳ r′, and S ⊢N2 B(r) ∧B(r
′)}.
So Rej′ only contains clauses from P1 and not from P2, i.e., only rules from P1 are
rejected.
We denote by ∪P the set of all rules occurring in P, i.e., ∪P = ∪ni=1Pi. By P
S we
denote the standard reduct of a program P with respect to a set of literals S.
Lemma 2
Let P = (P1, P2) be an update sequence over a set of atoms A and S ⊆ LitA a set of
literals. Then, S is an answer set of P iff S is an answer set of (P1\Rej′(S,P))∪P2.
Proof
S is an answer set of P iff
S is the minimal model of (∪P\Rej(S,P))S (by Theorem 4 given in (Eiter et al. 2002))
iff
S is an answer set of (P1 ∪ P2) \Rej(S,P) iff
S is an answer set of (P1 \Rej′(S,P)) ∪ P2 (by Note a) as desired.
Lemma 3
Let P be an extended logic program, x a literal, and M a set of literals. If P ⊢N2 x
and M ⊢N2 P , then ∃ r ∈ P such that r has the form x← β and M ⊢N2 β.
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Proof
Due to the translation from Nelson logics to intermediate logics, we may suppose to
be inG3. The translation adds more rules to the programs but these are constraints,
so the result is not affected. Additionally, this allows us to replace the literal x by
an atom a. Assume by contradiction that ∀r ∈ P such that r has the form a← β,
M ⊢N2 β is false. We need to prove that P ⊢N2 a is false. Let us construct an
interpretation I based on M . If an atom belongs to M we assign to it the value 2.
If the negation of an atom belongs to M we assign to it the value 0. Since M ⊢N2 P
then clearly I models P . Now we construct another interpretation I ′ based on I as
follows. All atoms but a are assigned the same value as in I, while a is assigned the
value 1. It is easy but tedious to check that I ′ also models P . However, I ′ does not
model a, as desired.
Lemma 4
Let P1, P2, {c}, and {r} be extended logic programs where r ∈ P1 and c is a
tau-free rule. Let M be a set of literals. Suppose P2 ⊢N2 c, M ⊢N2 B(r) ∧ B(c),
and M ⊢N2 P2. Also, r and c are conflicting rules. Then ∃ r
′∈P2 such that r′ is a
conflicting rule with r and M ⊢N2 B(r
′).
Proof
Let c and r be formulas of the form x← θ and∼x← β, respectively. We assume that
r ∈ P1, M ⊢N2 β, and that c and r are conflicting rules. Furthermore, we assume
M ⊢N2 P2 ∪ {θ}. Also by hypothesis P2 ⊢N2 θ → x, therefore P2 ∪ {θ} ⊢N2 x. Then
by Lemma 3, ∃ r′ ∈ P2∪{θ} such that r′ is of the form x← B(r′) andM ⊢N2 B(r
′).
Moreover r′ ∈ P2, due to the restriction that c is a tau-free rule and consequently
cannot contain x in its body.
Lemma 5
Let P1, P2, and {c} be extended logic programs where {c} is tau-free. Suppose
S ⊢N2 P2 and P2 ⊢N2 c. Then Rej
′(S, (P1, P2)) = Rej
′(S, (P1, P2 ∪ {c}).
Proof
We need to prove two cases:
Case 1) Rej′(S, (P1, P2)) ⊆ Rej′(S, (P1, P2 ∪ {c}). Clearly holds.
Case 2) Rej′(S, (P1, P2 ∪ {c}) ⊆ Rej′(S, (P1, P2))
Let r ∈ Rej′(S, (P1, P2 ∪ {c})) then ∃r′ ∈ (P2 ∪ {c}) such that S ⊢N2 B(r) ∧B(r
′).
Here we have two cases:
a) If r′ ∈ P2 then r ∈ Rej
′(S, (P1, P2)) as desired.
b) If r′ = c, we have r ∈ P1, P2 ⊢N2 c, S ⊢N2 B(r)∧B(c), r and c are conflicting
rules, and by hypothesis S ⊢N2 P2. Then by Lemma 4, ∃r” ∈ P2 such that r and
r” are conflicting rules and S ⊢N2 B(r) ∧ B(r”). Hence, r ∈ Rej
′(S, (P1, P2)) as
desired.
Note b: P ′ ⊢N2 c implies P
′ ≡N2 P
′ ∪ {c}.
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Lemma 6
Let P1, P2, and {c} be extended logic programs where {c} is tau-free. If P2 ⊢N2 c
then P1 ⊕1 P2 ≡ P1 ⊕1 (P2 ∪ {c}).
Proof
S is an answer set of P1 ⊕1 P2 iff by Lemma 2
S is an answer set of (P1 \Rej′(S, (P1, P2))) ∪ P2 iff by Lemma 5
S is an answer set of (P1 \Rej′(S, (P1, P2 ∪ {c}))) ∪ P2 iff by Note b
S is an answer set of (P1 \Rej′(S, (P1, P2 ∪ {c}))) ∪ (P2 ∪ {c}) iff by Lemma 2
S is an answer set of P1 ⊕1 (P2 ∪ {c})
Hence, P1 ⊕1 P2 ≡ P1 ⊕1 (P2 ∪ {c}) as desired.
Now we can present our main result.
Lemma 7
Let P1, P2, and R be extended logic programs where R is tau-free. Suppose that
P2 ⊢N2 R, then P1 ⊕1 P2 ≡ P1 ⊕1 (P2 ∪R).
Proof
By induction on the size of R.
Base case: Let R = ∅, the result is immediate.
Induction step: Let P2, R, and {c} be extended logic programs where R and {c}
are tau-free. We need to show:
if P2 ⊢N2 R ∪ {c} then P1 ⊕1 P2 ≡ P1 ⊕1 (P2 ∪ (R ∪ {c})).
But we know that P2 ⊢N2 R ∪ {c} means that P2 ⊢N2 R and P2 ⊢N2 c, then by
applying the induction hypothesis
P1⊕1 P2 ≡ P1 ⊕1 (P2 ∪R) (I)
By Lemma 6, if P2∪R ⊢N2 c then P1⊕1 (P2∪R) ≡ P1⊕1 ((P2∪R)∪{c}) (II)
Now, from (I) and (II) we have P1 ⊕1 P2 ≡ P1 ⊕1 ((P2 ∪R) ∪ {c})
Since P1 ⊕1 ((P2 ∪R) ∪ {c}) ≡ P1 ⊕1 (P2 ∪ (R ∪ {c}))
we obtain P1⊕1P2 ≡ P1⊕1 (P2∪ (R∪{c})) as desired.
We have proven that the BK-0 property holds for the ⊕1 operator if R is tau-
free. If we apply the proof of Theorem 4 of Section 3 under this restriction, this
results in the fact that BK-6 holds provided P1 and P2 are tau-free.
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 1
Recall that an alternative proof is presented in (Ferraris and Lifschitz 2005).
Let P be a program over a set of atoms A and x a literal that does not occur
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in P . Let F be a formula over a set of atoms F such that LitF ⊆ LitA. Then
P ∪ {F ← x} ≡ P ∪ {x↔ F}.
If we apply the definition of an answer set given in Theorem 1, then we only need
to prove
P, F → x,¬M˜ ∪ ¬¬M N2 M iff
P, F ↔ x,¬M˜ ∪ ¬¬M N2 M
First, we apply the transformation described in Section 2.2 to reduce the previous
statement to provability in G3, obtaining
P ′, F ′ → x,¬(x′ ∧ x), C′,¬M˜ ∪ ¬¬M G3 M iff
P ′, F ′ ↔ x,¬(x′ ∧ x), C′,¬M˜ ∪ ¬¬M G3 M
where P ′ represents program P after the change of literals ∼l by atoms l′, F ′ the
formula F after the same changes, and C′ the set of added constraints (excluding
the constraint involving x). Now we have two cases.
I) x /∈M so ¬x ∈ ¬M˜
In this case the statement to prove becomes
P ′, F ′ → x,¬x,¬(x′ ∧ x), C′,¬M˜ ′ ∪ ¬¬M G3 M iff
P ′, F ′ ↔ x,¬x,¬(x′ ∧ x), C′,¬M˜ ′ ∪ ¬¬M G3 M
where M˜ ′ denotes the set M˜ ′ excluding the atom x. It is easy to show that
F ′ → x,¬x ≡G3 F
′ ↔ x,¬x so the statement holds for both implications.
II) x ∈M so ¬¬x ∈ ¬¬M
In this case the statement to prove becomes
P ′, F ′ → x,¬¬x,¬(x′ ∧ x), C′,¬M˜ ∪ ¬¬M ′ G3 M iff
P ′, F ′ ↔ x,¬¬x,¬(x′ ∧ x), C′,¬M˜ ∪ ¬¬M ′ G3 M
where M ′ denotes the set M ′ excluding the atom x. It is easy to show that this
statement can be reduced to
P ′, F ′ → x,¬¬x,¬x′, C′,¬M˜ ∪ ¬¬M ′ G3 M iff
P ′, F ′ ↔ x,¬¬x,¬x′, C′,¬M˜ ∪ ¬¬M ′ G3 M
We will abbreviate the statement above in the following way
F ′ → x,¬¬x,H G3 M iff
28 M. Osorio et al.
F ′ ↔ x,¬¬x,H G3 M
It is important to remark that x does not occur in H or in F ′. For consistency,
the right implication clearly holds. We prove the left implication as follows. We
assume F ′ → x,¬¬x,H is consistent and complete. By the results obtained in
(Osorio et al. 2004; Osorio et al. 2001) F ′ → x,H is also consistent and complete.
So there is an interpretation I such that I(H) = 2. We construct a new interpre-
tation I ′ that differs from I only in that I ′(x) = I(F ), so I ′ models F ′ ↔ x,H .
Therefore F ′ ↔ x,H is consistent. Since by hypothesis F ′ → x,¬¬x,H G3 x
(because x ∈M) then clearly F ′ → x,H G3 x. So F
′ ↔ x,¬¬x,H is consistent.
In respect to logical consequence, the right implication clearly holds. We will prove
the left implication for every atom a ∈ M . Again from the results obtained in
(Osorio et al. 2004; Osorio et al. 2001) we can replace F ′ ↔ x,¬¬x,H by F ′ ↔
x,H in our proof, so we only need to prove
if F ′ ↔ x,H ⊢G3 a then F
′ → x,H ⊢G3 a
We will prove its contrapositive, i.e.
if ∃I I((F ′ ↔ x) ∧H) > I(a) then ∃I ′ I ′((F ′ → x) ∧H) > I ′(a)
If a = x then we have several cases. If I((F ′ → x) ∧ H) = 2 and I(a) = I(x) = 0
then I(F ′) must evaluate to 0, so with I ′ := I the statement holds. The case when
I((F ′ → x) ∧ H) = 1 and I(x) = 0 is analogous. For the case when I((F ′ →
x) ∧ H) = 2 and I(x) = 1, if I(F ′) = 1 then we define I ′ := I as in the previous
cases. Now if I(F ′) = 0 we take I ′ to be equal to I except for the fact that we
define I ′(x) = 0, which satisfies the desired condition. The proof for the case when
x 6= a is analogous but simpler, and is therefore omitted.
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